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JCSM-l66-6l and, after reviewing the JCS findings, he stated that the "Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation still seems to be a choice between these three alternatives but they still 23/ state that the Trinidad plan was preferred."- Despite the discussion, the most important aspect of JCSM-l66-6l failed to emerge. The memorandum was addressed to the Secretary of Defense, President Kennedy's appointee, Robert McNamara, and recommended that: a. The Secretary of Defense support the views ot the Joint Chiefs of Staff as ex- pressed in the conclusions. b. The views expressed in the above conclusions be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, to- gether with three copies of the appen- . dices hereto, .f~7r his information and consideration.~ To the observer long after the event, it is inconceivable that neither the JCS representatives nor the Agency representatives in attendance at the second meeting, or at subsequent meetings of the Cuban Study Group brought these recommendations forcefully to Ta~lor's attention. The JCS's views would be completely ignored when McNama~a testified before the Cuban Study Group that: "It was my understanding that both the CIA and Chiefs ·25/ - preferred Zapata to Trinidad. ,,- Even in his final memo- randum of review of the findings of the Cuban Study Group, General Taylor would disregard McNamara's apparent lack of 26/ concern about the Joint Chiefs' me11)orandum.- Inasmuch as 42