◆ SpookStack

In the course of these discussions, it was made quite clear to the Cuban Study Group that, with minor but cor- rectable reservations, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had investigated the ground, air, and logistics capabilities which had been developed by the Agency, and that the JCS representatives had concluded that effective elements for the planned invasion were in being. The most serious problem specified by the JCS concerned logistics planning for the beachhead, but this problem was given a direct assist by a representative of the Joint staff who volunteered to work on the project. In a meeting of 11 March 1961, the Agency presented its plan for the invasion of Cuba to the President, the Secretary of State, senior DOD personnel, and others, but as a result of objections from the Department of State and at the direction of the President, the Agency was ordered to seek alternative sites and plans for the operation intially developed for the invasion at Trinidad. The result was the ~ubmission and approval in the period of 16-17 March 19.61 of the Zapata plan which moved the site of the invasion from Trinidad to the Bahia de Cochinos. In response to General Taylor's questions during the second meeting of the Cuban Study Group, Gen. David Gray, Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited various portions of JCSM-166-6l of 15 March 1961 which was used as the basis for the Joint Chiefs' acceptance of the Zapata plan.* Of the ~ive conclusions of the Joint Chiefs * JCSM-16i-6l was entitled "Evaluation of the Military Aspects of Alt~rnate Concepts, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba."