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to him. I still think it was a mistake on our part not to make the appeal. 115/ As told to the Taylor Committee, Rusk's version of the meeting with Cabell and Bissell showed signifi- cant differences from that just quoted. After stating that neither he nor the President realized that there was going to be anything other than the D-Day air strike, Rusk said the President: Didn't think there should be second strikes in the area unless there were overriding considerations ... [Bissell and General Cabell] indicated that the air strikes would be important~ but not critical. I offered to let them call the President, but they indicated they didn't think the matter was that impor- tant. They said that they preferred not to call the President •.. Since Mr. Bissell and General Cabell didn't want to talk to the President on the matter, I felt there was no overriding consideration to advise him of. I didn't think they be- lieved the dawn air strikes were too important. 116/* If, indeed, the Cabell-Bissell memorandum of the cancellation is accurate in its statement of the e£- fects of the cancellation, it is difficult to under- stand how Secretary Rusk concluded that the CIA duo * Emphasis by author. - 275 -