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did not depend nearly so heavily on air cover as did conventional amphibious op- erations by organized troops. More than that, a fact that is very little known is that the Joint Chiefs, more than once in their discussions of the operation, had expressed some doubt about the absolute essentiality of these air strikes. I don't want this remark to be subject in any way to the interpre- tation that the Joint Chiefs did not favor these air strikes, or did not believe that they improved the military chances. But they attached less critical importance to them than did, for instance, the Marine colonel, who was really in direct charge of the planning of the operation. I think that knowledge of this attitude on the part of the Joint Chiefs may have had a little influence on General Cabell's and my decision that we won't pursue the matter further with the President that Sunday night. I think knowledge of this attitude by the Joint Chiefs may well have been reported to the President, although it never was in my hearing. And if so, I'm sure it would have influenced him very significantly. Later that night General Cabell went and made another appeal, first to Rusk and then, from Rusk's apartment, on the tele- phone to the President. This was an appeal for the authority to use U.S. Naval air -- I think it was in as far as the three mile limit. This was a much milder request than the request for another strategic strike by the Cuban aircraft. And yet it was turned down by the President. I must admit I have always taken that as an in- dication, as has Cabell, that our original judgment was correct, that the President would not have been moved by our appeal - 274 -