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'I I :1 ',I "1 ,I ,I I I I I I I I I I I I The memorandum was initially signed by C. P. Cabell, General, USAF, Deputy Director (of CIA). Typed beneath Cabell's signature was the following: "the foregoing conforms to my recollection" and this was signed by Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Deputy Director, Plans.* Clearly, according to Cabell and Bissell, political considerations negated the military importance of the D-Day strike. Paradoxically, however, the Secretary of State did agree that the B-26's could be used to fly beach cover for the invading forces. How it was expected that this limitation would be less of a risk to the US in the UN is inexplicable. * Conspicuous by his absence at this critical time was Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence. Dulles was in Puerto Rico fulfilling a previous com- mitment to address the ~ung President's Organization. The author was told by Mr. Dulles's former Special Assistant, Walter Elder that it was decided that plausible deniability could best be supported if Dulles made his planned sp~ech. Cancellation, it was feared, either would be a tip-off to the upcoming attack or would lead to charges that CIA was behind the invasion -- charges which were made in any event. However, since Dulles did not depart Headquarters un- til Saturday, 15 April 1961, arriving in Puerto Rico that evening, this would seem to have been a rather weak rationale -- Dulles was actually in Washington as the 0-2 air strike was in progress. Dulles de- parted Puerto Rico on 17 April, arriving at Friend- ship Airport around midnight. 114a/ 1\- (L . [ uffi--<-I--.J J'I"-¥'\i - 272 -