◆ SpookStack

S. After considering the foregoing, the Secretary of state agreed that strikes could be made in the immediate beachhead area but confirmed that the planned air strikes against Cuban airfields, a harbor, and a radio broadcasting station, could '. not be permitted and the decision to cancel would stand. He asked if I should like to speak to the President. Mr. Bissell and I were impressed with the extremely deli- cate situation with Ambassador Stevenson and the United Nations and the risk to the entire political position of the United· States, and the firm position of the Secretary. We saw no point in my speaking personally to the President and so informed the Secretary. 6. Our immediate problem then was quickly to dispatch the necessary order to the Air Base in Puerto Cabezas carry- ing out the instructions to stop the planned air strike and to require re- planning and re-briefing of crews. (This was barely accomplished as the order to cancel caught the crews in their cockpits.) 7. Our next task was to try and com- pensate for the loss of effective air strikes. In order to protect the ship- ping as it withdrew from the beachhead, I arranged with the Navy to stand by pending authority to give fighter cover. At 4:30 a.m., 17 April (D-Day), I called on the Secretary of State at his home and reiter- ated the need to protect the shipping. The Secretary telephoned the President and put me on the phone •. After I made the request the President asked that the Secretary be put back on. After conversa- tion with the President, the Secretary informed me that the request for air cover was disapproved. 114/ - 271 -