◆ SpookStack

eae ee cd attempting to nourish the underground. There were six success- ful boat operations, carrying men and materials, in February and 13 in March, and two successful air drops in March. Infil- tration of agents was continuing. As of 15 February Miami Base reported the following numbers and types of agents in Cuba: Counterintelligence, 20; positive intelligence, 5; propaganda, 2; paramilitary, 4. As of 15 March the base reported that these numbers had risen, respectively, to 21, 11, 9, and 6. 69. By the invasion date the personnel strength of Miami Base had grown to 160. The intensity of activity there during the latter months of the operation is indicated by the record of a day picked at random -- it happened to be 9 February -- when 21 case officers spent 140 man hours in personal contact with 125 Cubans. 7O. Successive changes in the operational plan and post- ponements of the strike date are discussed later in this . report and are documented in Annexes C, D, and E. Detailed policy authorization for some specific actions was either never fully clarified or only resolved at the eleventh hour, and even the central decision as to whether to employ the strike force was still somewhat in doubt up to the very moment of embarka- tion. fi. During the weeks preceding the invasion the pace of events quickened. In early March the State Department asked the