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a a ae a On ee 64. On 17 February the Agency presented a paper (Annex B) to the President which outlined three possible courses of action against Castro. 65. Noting plans for early formation of a government in exile, the paper described the growing strength of the Castro regime under Bloc support and observed: "Therefore, after some date probably no more than six months away it will become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except by the commitment to combat of a sizeable organized military force. The option of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be open.” 66. This paper found the use of small-scale guerrilla groups not feasible and advocated a surprise landing of a mili- tary force, concluding that the brigade had a good chance of overthrowing Castro "or at the very least causing a damaging civil war without requiring the U.S. to commit itself to overt action against Cuba." 67. Following presentation of this paper to the President, the project leaders were given to understand that it would be at least two weeks before a decision would be made as to use of the invasion force. They thereupon withheld action to expand the force up to 1,000 for the time being. Movement of Agents 68. Although the invasion preparations were absorbing most of the project's energies and funds wH/) Branch was still - 23 -