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Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5 SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS 29 April 1984 SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984 Playing embassy chess It appears that Libya’s leader, Moammar Khadafy, doesn’t have enough to do in the day-by-day governing of his country. Tn any case, Khadafy has taken up several exciting hobbies. One is - attacking or otherwise alienating other countries. The French, Jordanian and U.S, embassies in Tripoli have been at- tacked and most recently the Brit- ish Embassy has been subjected to coercion. The national territories of Chad, Egypt and Sudan have been at- ‘tacked or threatened. Fourteen na- tions have normal rela- tions with Libya since 1980. Terrorism is another active pur- suit of Khadafy’s. About the same time that he seized power by mili- tary coup in Libya in 1969, interna- tional terrorism’ was beginning to bloom. Khadafy bankrolled several inajor terrorist movements of both right and left extremists. «+s Meanwhile, Khadafy retains the initiative by pronouncing threats that attain worldwide notice. An example occurred last month. After Libyan aircraft attacked Omdurman, Sudan, the United States deployed two Air Force AWACS airborne control aircraft to Egypt. That was done at the re- quest of the Sudanese and the ians to assist in defending against further air attacks. Kha. dafy then threatened to shoot down the AWACS. Last week, he announced a mew program of expanded help to Trish Republican Army. That move was related apparently to the re- cent act of terrorism carried out from the Libyan Embassy in Lon- don. In turn, that caused British te to break relations with a. The British attempted to adhere scrupulous! to the norms of diplo- mat fe behavior insioad of brea into the Libyan Embassy and col laring the murderer. it of interna- The particular tional law involved is called “extra- territoriality.” In simpler terms, Glen W. Martin that is the immunity of foreign dip- tomatic People and real estate from specified local laws. ‘That principle has been evolving for many centuries and most re- cently was elaborated in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela- tions in 1963. The British decision to conform in this instance created a furor within their own government. It probably was a wise move, never- theless, because Khadafy could re- taliate against the British Embassy in Tripol , with or without a pre- text. Beyond the trading of embassies, as rooks in a chess game, there is a mass hostage possibility on both sides. There are reported to be about 4,000 Libyans in Britain and 8,000 Britons in Libya. There are also some hundreds of Americans remaining in Libya. ‘They have not been harassed since the U.S.-Libyan diplomatic break a few years ago. Those British decid- ing to stay in Libya have that ex- ample in mind. Let us assume that those condi- tions change — Khadafy does have, and seems to enjoy, the repu- tation of being unpredictable. Sup- Pose the British citizens are abused. What next? Remember the Falklands. First, it would be disadvanta- geous for Khadafy to withstand world opinion by interferin; with an o1 mass evacuat the British residing in Libya. So evacuation is one possibility. Second, however, British exper- tise in the Libyan oil fields would be missed, at least temporarily un- tl some other Gountry win petro- um expertise . If events take that turn, the Brit- ish undoubtedly would make an ur- gent plea for U.S. help. Remember the Falklands. The main argument could be based on the importance of barring the way against Soviet incursions in Libya. That brings up another possibil- ity. Khadafy, at any time, could be in touch with Moscow to lay the groundwork for Soviet technicians ree we r sident, At "Ss J nwar Sadat, considered Khadaty to be a madman. On the other hand, Kha- dafy is quite aware no doubt that it is just as dangerous (although more difficult) to grab a bear by the tail as it is a tiger. Letting go can be perilous. Even so, the fact that it took the Kremlin one week to announce its ition on the British-Libyan con- rontation shows the probability of some Soviet-Libyan consultation. British military action against Libya would be handicapped by So- viet support of Khadaty. The pres- ence of 000 British subjects would also constrain British military op- erations. In this column a little more than two years ago, a lesson from the Iranian hostage crisis was cited “To avoid or reduce the likeli- hood of losing American citizens to hostile capture and thereby pre- serve U.S. freedom of action, an evacuation of Americans from a foreign country (Libya) should be Carried out expeditiously. .. .” That is a lesson the British ‘should ponder today. Libya has the smallest military establishment of any nation along the North African coast, except for Tunisia. Why then, Khadafy’s continuous pushing, adventuring and threaten- 1g? He has three aces up his sleeve. Militarily, he has the largest com- bat air force among those nations. Economically, he has the basis for profitable international trade, iLe., products to export and money to buy imports. Politically, he has -honed terror- ism into a feared international weapon of blackmail and deter- ce. ren (c) 1984, Glen W. Martin: Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : ciA§app96-00788R000100330001-5