◆ SpookStack

Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5 .oward a “common agreement.” So far as we know, none has been reached. The FBI has also been hamstrung re- cently in the area of preventive investiga- tions. In a suit filed in Federal District Court in Chicago by the ACLU and the Alliance to End Repression (a front for the U.S. Communist Party), Judge Susan Getzendanner issued an injunction which disallows implementation of new FBI domestic security guidelines initiated by Attomey General William French Smith in 1983. Under the new guidelines the FBI would have been able to investigate indi- viduals or groups who advocated criminal activity or intent to commit a crime of violence. The outcome is that the FBI can investigate only committed crimes, not in- dividuals planning to commit crimes. Regarding security checks on workers hired for the Games, the police are permit- ted to instigate background checks, but are not allowed to take workers’ finger- prints nor administer lie-detector tests. In the event of an act of terrorism which involves the taking of hostages. exactly what would the response be? Well, we have several options. One is the use of the LAPD SWAT Team. Another is the use of the L.A. County Sheriff's Department SWAT Team, Another is the use of the FBI SWAT Team, and still another is the use of the one-year-old, untested FBI Hostage Rescue Team. Perhaps more ‘final op- tions” than we need? The police have been given the job of Olympic security and terrorist-action re- sponse over the military for a number of reasons, all of which seem to evolve around image rather than action. To quote FBI Director William Webster (op. cit.): “Because of the FBI's readiness, there is no need for stationing a special Army Commando team close to Los Angeles during the Games.” Webster went on to state that the Army does not concentrate on training that will allow the saving of lives, and that the FBI team will provide a“... civilian response, not a military response.” Unfortunately, this thinking echoes back to the Munich deba- cle. Unlike Munich, the Olympic Villages in Los Angeles will be ringed with tight secur- ity — at least in the beginning. What will happen if the press complains again of Gestapo tactics? The two villages in L.A., one on the UCLA campus and the other on the USC (University of Southern Cali- fornia) campus, will be surrounded by high-security, alarm-wired and electroni- cally monitored fences. Entrance check- points will be guarded by armed police, and athletes and press will be required to SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984 KILLING FOR THE GOLD. ..Continued show a special photo I.D. which features an electronic bar code. Metal detectors will be set up at the village gates and will also be used at the entrances to all events. At least L.A. will not be as “easy and relaxed” as was Munich in ‘72. However, even with the security pre- cautions already under preparation, the most glaring error that persists is the lack of a centralized control over all security forces. The Olympic officials are convinced that the proper response to terrorism is a police response. But do the police have the right background for the job? The effectiveness of the LAPD SWAT team is highly touted in law-enforcement circles — but is it for their response to terrorist activities, or for their response to drunk or drugged-out husband/boytriends who threaten to kill their mates ina moment of insanity? Professional terrorists are not momen- tarily insane. They are cold, ruthless killers who practice their trade on an internation- al front. They consider themselves sol- diers and “freedom fighters” — not cri- minals. While the LAPD SWAT team may be good, I can only cite their performance against one terrorist group — the Sym- bionese Liberation Army in the famed shootout of 17 May 1974. In that fiasco, the SWAT team literally tore apart the 29 training exercise geared toward the possibility of terrorist attacks at the Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. house holding the terrorists with uncon- trolled gunfire, finally bringing the siege to an end with tear-gas cannisters that ignited the home and created a blazing infemo. None of the terrorists were cap- tured alive. Is this what Webster terms a “police response”’? What steps could we take to augment current Olympic security plans? To start, a centralized command must be estab- lished. This centralized command should be capable of dispatching the correct re- sponse to any terrorist activity at a mo- ment's notice. The commander should not be affected by local politics, nor be concemed with “public image.” An im- partial commander should be selected — and all local forces should be subjugated to his control. In short, the overall security commander should come from the ranks of the military — not the police. But then, I suppose “image” is far more important than innocent lives. Approved For Release 2000/08/07 : CIA-RDP96-00788R000100330001-5