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Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP81R00560R000100010001-0 SECTION IX THE AIR FORCE INVESTIGATION Abstract NICAP contends that the Air Force has practiced an intoler- able degree of secrecy and withholding of information in its public policies on the UFO subject, and refuses to allow an independent evaluation of its data. There are two general schools of thought on the reasons for this secrecy: (1) That the Air Force has obtained significant proof of UFO reality, and is withholding its evidence until the public can be psychologically prepared under a program guided by some higher agency; (2) That the withholding of information is not because of any special knowledge on the subject, but results more or less unconsciously from red tape, lack of continuity to the UFO project, differences of opinion within the Air Force, etc. In either case, the secretive public information policies are symptomatic of the general governmental secrecy which has mushroomed since World War II, and must be viewed in that context. Since official secrecy has become so commonplace, almost an accepted way of life, the topic is extremely complex. For the sake of simplicity, this section is presented mostly in outline form: A. Background of Government Secrecy . Air Force Regulations & Policies 1. History of the UFO Project Air Force Statements About Its UFO Investigation/NICAP Rebuttals . Sample UFO Cases Involving Aspects of Secrecy. A. GOVERNMENT SECRECY It is a generally conceded fact in Washington that government secrecy, since World War II, has grown by leaps and bounds. Even high-ranking officers in the Pentagon, in testimony to Con- gress, state that there is considerable over-classification of information. Sometimes it appears tobe a case of the tail wagging the dog. There is no simple solution to this problem, though it should be a matter of concern to anyone who believes in democracy. It is worth examining the structure of this secrecy, to pinpoint some aspects of it which have been uncovered by Congressional inves- tigators, scholars and newsmen. The Cold War burden plainly has put a severe strain on the traditional American belief in freedom of information. Censors can (and sometimes do) make a case that almost any information released in this technological age is of value to a potential enemy. Often information is withheld in the name of the ‘‘public interest.”” But who defines the ‘‘public interest?” Rep. John E. Moss (D.-Calif.), Chairman of the Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Information, has long been a champion of the public’s ‘“‘right to know.” Hearings by his subcommittee over the past several years have brought out many specific instances of unwarranted secrecy, especially by the Executive Branch, The subcommittee was chartered on June 9, 1955. A year later, the parent committee unanimously adopted House Report No. 2947, which included a study of Defense Depart- ment secrecy. The report stated: “The study of the Defense Department so far shows that the informational policies and practices of the Department are the most restrictive--and at the same time the most confused--of any major branch of the Federal Government.” [2] Two recent books indicate that there has been no appreciable change in Defense Department information practices. Clark R. B, Cc. D. Mollenhoff, Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for Cowles Publica- tions, in his 1963 book Washington Cover-Up, states what he be- lieves is the crux of the problem: “. . . the arbitrary secrecy of ‘executive privilege’ . . . There would be ‘managed news’ as long as executive departments and independent regulatory agencies were able to invoke an arbitrary secrecy to prevent the press and Congress from reviewing the record--and as long as news- papers indolently accepted the management.” [2] Power In Washington, by Douglass Cater, also probes Wash- ington “‘sub-governments’’ and their influence on government pol- icies. According to reviewer James MacGregor Burns, Cater considers the ‘‘military-industrial complex” (so phrased by President Eisenhower) a sub-government. Part of it is ‘‘news managers in the Pentagon who try to influence public opinion.’” [3] In summary, these aspects of the secrecy brought out by the Moss subcommittee particularly concern us: * The Defense Department, in practice, claims executive privilege to withhold information from Congress and the public; existing directives leave the decision in specific cases to an ar- bitrary judgment by the Defense Department. * Because of over-classification, the public often is not kept properly informed. * By existing regulations, Defense Department personnel are forced to justify release of information and are not required to justify withholding of it. (A natural desire on the part of indivi- duals to avoid trouble on controversial issues by not releasing information about them results in excessive secrecy). A more pervasive tendency has developed among the military services to issue reassuring statements, rather than facts; generalized statements putting the best face on the matter (as far as the agency is concerned), rather than useful detail. In short, the concept of ‘‘public information’’ has been perverted to public relations, which tries to put across a favorable idea or image rather than to inform. B. AIR FORCE REGULATIONS & POLICIES 1. Regulations Governing the UFO Investigation Air Force Regulation 200-2, ‘Intelligence; Unidentified Flying Objects (UFOs), . . . establishes the responsibility and procedure 105 for reporting information and evidence on [UFOs] and for re- leasing pertinent information to the general public.’” Paragraph 3c, rather than furnishing objective guidelines, biases the investigation by clearly implying that all UFOsare explainable as misidentified conventional objects. (Thus the investigation assumes its own conclusion). Contrary to the oft-repeated public relations announcements about the investigation being ‘‘completely objective and scientific,” the regulation states what the conclusion of the investigation must be: “ec, Reduction of Percentage of UFO ‘Unknowns.’ Air Force activities must reduce the percentage of unknowns to the mini- mum. Analysis thus far has provided explanation for all but a few of the sightings reported. These unexplained sightings are carried statistically as unknowns. If more immediate, detailed objective data on the unknowns had been available, probably these too could have been explained. . . [Due to subjective factors] it is improbable that all of the unknowns can be eliminated.’ Paragraph 9 explicitly states that, in the area of occurrence, only explained cases may be released to the public: Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP81R00560R000100010001-0