◆ SpookStack

the point where they feel they should train and equip troops, the JCS should be brought in to make an evaluation. This should be done even before the President makes his decision. Then at the point when the operation is approved the military commander should take over so he can shape the whole operation. 85/ One implication--intended or not--was that with strong leadership the Department of Defense and the CIA might become de facto policy makers. This was not one of the suggestions which would appear in the final report from General Taylor to the President. This proposal was significantly different from the proposals in JCSM-44-61 "US Plan of Action in Cuba" (27 January 1961l in which the JCS proposed that an Interdepartmental Planning Group undertake to develop a plan to overthrow the Castro government. In an 'escalating scale of action, the Department of Defense would become overtly involved in the operation. No reference was made to this plan in McNamara's testimony and apparently the JCS never had a response from McNamara to the report. The Taylor Committee noted, uncritically, that JCSM-44-61 "reached the Secretary of Defense but appears to have been lost in the activities ensuing out of the change in administra- tion."86/ The question of why such an oversight went unchallenged has never been asked. The final witness at the ninth session of the Taylor Committee was General Earl G. Wheeler, Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 89 In sharp contrast to