◆ SpookStack

One of the few points on which Mr. Bundy was challenged was with reference to his statement that he did not believe that the operation had been run from the White House. One of the members of the committee, otherwise unidentified, stated "the messages make it appear that it was very close to this Icontrol of the operation from the White House]. Was this 6.5/ desirable?" Mr. Bundy did agree that the planning should have been more explicitly laid out and that the responsibilities more clearly defined. In his summary statement he indicated that among the numerous lessons which were learned as a result of this operation were the following: political risks would have been minimized by quick, positive success; the excessive concerns for secrecy, covertness, and plausible deniability were so extreme that they made for inefficiency in the operation; and both Agency and military personnel became advocates of the operation and found themselves unable to render objective judgments--the less so the longer the invasion was postponed. Perhaps the most serious weakness according to Mr. Bundy was the failure of senior personnel to step 66/* forward and speak about their reservations. As to the last item, General Taylor strongly supported Mr. Bundy's position noting, "I don't believe the military view, ~ Bundy's statement on deniability was: "As I reflect on the cove~tness of this operation, I'm amazed that we thought there was a chance of deniability." 67/ This was quite a switch because on 18 April 1961, he was urging-the President to authorize USN air support for the B-26s because "the immediate request I would grant (pecause it cannot easily be proven against us and because the men are in need,l ••• "68/ 75