◆ SpookStack

the invasion vessels in order to accommodate the necessary materiel, equipment, and personnel for running the air operation from the beachhead. Following his misconception regarding the Agency's position vis-a-vis the Zapata plan, Mr. Bundy then advanced some additional speculations. In stating that, "it was clearly understood that the air battle should be won," Mr. Bundy simply was repeating a position which he had advanced at the time that the Trinidad and Zapata plans were being discussed (11 - 16 March 1976). In a memorandum to President Kennedy, Mr. Bundy had written: Even the revised landing plan [Zapata] depends strongly upon prompt action against .Castro's air. The question in my mind is whether we cannot solve this problem by having the air strike come some time before the invasion. A group of patriotic airplanes flying from Nicaraguan bases might knock out Castr6's air force in a single day with- out anyone knowing (for soine time) where they came from . ~/ That Mr. Bundy on the one hand could make such positive statements regarding the need to control the air and then on the other hand state, as he did in his memorandum to General Taylor, that: One startling ommission, in retrospect, is the failure of any of the President's advisers to warn of the danger of the T-33s. I suspect that one reason for the later decision (by the President] not to launch an air strike on the morning of D-Day was that this capability of the. Castro air force was never put forward as significant. 59/ 68