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BayOfPigsVolumeIVTheTaylorCommitteeInvestigationOfTheBayOfPigs
Page 247
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compelled readjustments of cargoes on the Houston and other
vessels.
It was the shift from Trinidad to Zapata that led
to the mad scramble at the last minute to acquire the aluminum
small boats to off-load the troops at the Playa Larga site
at the north end of the Bahia de Cochinos.
,~
No
~erious questions were raised by the committee
concerning the performance of the Brigade despite the sharp
differences immediately apparent between the 24 April 1961
memorandum that Col. Hawkins presented to the committee at
its third meeting and his 13 April 1961 cable from Nicaragua
extolling the virtues of both the Brigade's infantry and its
Air Force.
The committee apparently took for granted the
comments made at its first meeting concerning the heroic
fight waged by the invaders, despite the fact that well before
completing their work they learned that the bulk of the Brigade
had been taken prisoner and that fewer than a hundred men had
been killed.
8.
The failure of the USN'S CAP to meet the Brigade's
B-26s for the one hour of protection on 19 April 1961 was never
challenged.
How the B-26s could overfly the Essex one hour
early without being detected was ignored, even though the
USN'S most senior officer, Admiral Burke, was a committee
member,
The destruction of the operational records of the
. Essex which probably could have clarified the situation regard-
ing the missed CAP strongly suggests that senior naval officers
were interested in protecting their careers and/or the reputation
of the USN than in admitting to error.
This episode would
not have changed the outcome at the Bay of Pigs, but it
might have pe.rmitted the orderly withdrawal of some of the
Brigade. from the beach..
Moreover, no question was raised as
to why, at this stage of the operation, President Kennedy
limited the air support by the USN to one hour.
In addition to its failure to focus on any of the above
issues, the committee deserved sharp criticism for failing to
provide a verbatim transcript of its meetings.
The loss of
information from this decision is clearly evident in the
comparison between the verbatim record and the "official"
record of the first rneeting--the only session for which there
is known to be a verbatim transcript.
In this same category
was the committee.'s failure to insure that the record of all
meetings with witnesses clearly identified questioners,
241
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