◆ SpookStack

nature of CIA's business and the length of time that the project was under way, to believe that any Deputy Director-- particularly one charged with responsibility for producing finished economic, current, geographic, military, and photo intelligence on Latin America (including Cuba)--could have been as "in the dark" as claimed for Amory defies belief. The evidence shows that as early as 22 June 1960 one of Amory's staff,I 1attended a special NSC briefing on the Cuban situation when General Cabell outlined the Agency's anti-Castro program, including a discussion of the on-going training of a cadre of nearly c==JPM instructors and radio operators. At the latest, Amory learned the details about the planned operation on 10 March 1961. He was present when DCI Dulles briefed the CIA subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on all phases of the Trindad plan, including 't'h °lOt 0 0 ...e paraml 1 ary InvasIon. Amory also was present at the DCI's morning meeting on 30 March 1961 when DDS White discussed indemnification for the owners of the vessels to be used in the invasion "against the loss of their ships and whatever casualties may be suffered among the crews." Perhaps the most accurate statement regarding Amory's knowledgeability about the operation was made by Stewart Alsop who said: "The DDI was never given an opportunity to evaluate its [the Bay of Pigs] chance of success." y* * Recent declassification of the Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee revealed that Amory certainly knew about the invasion plan by 11 January 1961 when he accompanied DCI Dulles to Dulles's off the record briefing of the Committee. The DCI prefaced his co~ments by noting: "The Cuban and Guatemalan problems , are so closely tied together, sir, that with your approval I would like to present the two together. II ~/ 234