◆ SpookStack

which had been expressed during the course of the hearings, particularly by military witnesses, were indicated. The memorandum then related the story of the conversations involving Secretary of State Rusk, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Bissell, General Cabell, and the President of the United States on the evening of 0-1 (16 April 196J) when the President cancelled the D-Day air strikes. As with the records of the testimony of witness when the subject was discussed, the final report of the committee failed to indicate any concern about the rationale for this Presidential decision. The premise of deniability of US involvement if the B-26s could be said to be taking off from Cuban soil already had been blown with the 0-2 attacks on Castro's airfields. The knowledge that the attacking B-26s were not part of Castro's Fuerza Aerea Reyolucionaria was not limited to the Cubans,. 16/ but it had already been picked up by the media. The real issue was that without the planned D-Day air strike, the defeat of the invasion was inevitable. In describing the action over the beach on D-Day-- where Castro's Sea Furies and T-33s had clearly established a no-win position for the brigade unl~ss superior US aircraft were introduced for their support--the Taylor Committee report made the following interesting comment: "Impressed by the ease with which the T-33 aircraft could destroy the obsolete B-26 type aircraft, the CIA leaders decided to attempt, by a bombing 193