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of Staff evaluation of the Agency's paramilitary plan (JCSM- 57-61, "Military Evaluation of the CIA Paramilitary Plan- Cuba," 3 February 1961) had been submitted to the Secretary of Defense. The Taylor' Committee indicated that the conclusions of this JCSM generally supported CIA's Trinidad plan; and even though noting some shortcomings the JCSM stated: "This plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro 9/ regime." - The CSG's comments on JCSM-57-6l made no reference to any of the points which had been covered previously in JCSM-44-6l, nor had any of the witnesses from DOD been questioned on the proposals of the earlier JCSM which had outlined both the need for the military to playa major role in the Agency's anti-Castro effort and the probability that overt military action by the US might be required to support the invasion. Considering the importance. which the CSG hearings had attached to both the choice of Zapata over Tr~nidad and to air operations~ Memorandum No, 1 of the Taylor Committee largely ignored JCSM-5.7-6I t s treattt:lent of both subjects. * ;rt also * Of the invasion sites, the Joint Chiefs evaluation of the CIA paramilitary plan reported that: "Based on an independent analysis by the Joint Staff, the beachhead area lTrinidad] is considered to be the best area in Cuba for accomplishment of the Task Force Mission. 10/ 187