◆ SpookStack

The Cuba In] study Group met at luncheon with the President to give orally an interim report on their conclusions to date. In the course of the conversation, the following points were developed: There was no formal governmental review after March, 1960 of the necessity for a paramilitary operation to replace the Castro government. Although the President had many doubts with re- gard to such an operation, the pressure for an affirmative decision arising from the need to use the. Cuban Brigade quickly or disband it was a strong factor in causing an affirmative decision. In the· President's mind there was reasonable hope for a popular uprising following a successful landing as well as the possibility of setting up a free Cuban government in the beachhead after it had been firmly secured. The President was always reassured by the assumption that the Cuban Brigade in an emergency could pass to a guerrilla status. There was a breakdown in communication someplace between the training base in Guatemala and the senior officials in Washington which occassioned the misunderstanding of the feasibility of exercising the guerrilla option. It was clear to the President that the Trinidad plan had military advantages over Zapata. However, the choice of the latter overcame many of the political objections raised against Trinidad. With regard to the cancellation of the D-Day strikes, the President is inclined to think that a special NSC meeting should have been called to deal with this important matter. However, the. CIA officials in charge of the operation did not speak to him directly with regard to the critical nature of the cancellation. The President was aware of the serious shortage of ammunition in the beachhead at the end of 0+1. However, he was never approached for authority to extend the Navy air cover over the ammunition convoy in its movement to Blue Beach. 179