◆ SpookStack

did report that he had discussed it with both the Secretary of State and the DCI. The Secretary of State "was pretty receptive," but CIA apparently took a rather dim view of the JCS proposals since they already were involved in their own operational plan. No questions were raised by the Committee concerning the failure of General Lemnitzer to discuss this JCSM with the Secretary of Defense or, indeed, if the Secretary of Defense ever read the memo. There was a similar--and far more significant--communication . gap between General Leminitzer and Secretary MacNamara concerning the JCS's evaluation of the Trinidad and Zapara invasion plans. After clearly indicating that the Joint Chiefs favored the Trinidad over the Zapata plan, but nonetheless supported the Zapata plan, the following conversation took place between General Lemnitzer and one of the members of the CSG: Statement: You mention the preference for Trinidad--I'm not sure whether you're aware of it, but the Secretary of Defense apparently never appreciated that point. In fact, he had the impression that the Chiefs, thought that Zapata was the better of the two plans. General Lemnitzer: I just don't understand how he got that impression. I can show you in my notes on two accounts where I called it to his attention. We also put it in writing that "of the alternate plans, alternative three JZapata] is considered the most feasible and most likely to accomplish the objective. None of the alternates involved are as feasible and likely to accomplish the objectives as the present ITrinidad] paramilitary plan." I don't see how you can say it any clearer than that. 135