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Question: Did you attempt to advise the President as to the importance of the air strikes? Secretary Rusk: I had talked to him and he had stated that if there weren't overriding considerations the second strikes shouldn't be made. Since Mr. Bissell and General Cabell didn't want to talk to the President on the matter, I felt there were no overriding con- siderations to advise him of. I didn't think th~y believed the dawn air strikes were too important. I believe that Castro turned out to have more operational air strength than we figured. Mr. Dulles: I don't believe they had any more. However, they turned out to be more efficient. Question: Do you recall why the question of air strikes was withheld until Sunday evening? Secretary Rusk: As far as I was concerned, I was caught by surprise with the first air strikes. I was trying to advise Adlai Stevenson at the UN on what was happening and suddently found out there were additional air strikes coming up. We didn't want him to have to lie to the UN. 96/ Rusk's contention that there were underestimates both of the number of Castro'~ aircraft and the capability of Castro's air force have. already been discussed with reference 'to other witnesse,s before the Taylor Coromittee. Suffice to say here, the air operations people, particularly the Cuban and American pilots who were working to develop the B-26 capability, fully appreciated the danger that the T-33s and the Sea Furies pre- sented; and the full strength of Castro's air arm was positively identified and located. If Secretary Rusk was not clear about 99 /