◆ SpookStack

T.QP 3ECRr::T 2. That any move to curtail the number of aircraft to be employed from those available be firmly resisted. 3. That the operation be aba."1.doned if pOlicy does not provide for use of adequate tactical air support. In order to insure the success of both the air strike and the air drop operations which would pro- vide the logistical support for the troops holding the lodgment on Cuban soil, Hawkins urged, as he had in the past, authorization for the use of contract American pilots, the use of the airfield at Puerto Cabezas as an advance strike base, and the use of air bases in the United States for the ~aunching of logistical flight operations.* 3~/ Much the same ground indicatec.. in Hawkins memo- randurn was rehashed in preparing M.r _ Barnes and the DCI for a Special Group meeting of 5 January 1961. * There is'no indication that Hawkins ever changed his attitude about the need for L~e introduction of some US pilots into both the strike and logstics air operations, even though his much quoted cable of ·13 April 1961 from Puerto Cabezas repeated the high praise for the B-26 pilots who were about to under- take the D-2 air strike. See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Air Operations, Part III, A for discussion of the Ecwkins cable in the context of the air operations. - 193 - "for gECRR ,