◆ SpookStack

-«Of' 3l!CREl arrived with certain ideas which he carried from the Pentagon on how best to tackle the Cuban problem. This, however, did not con- stitute JMATE policy. I am sure you [Col. Jack Hawkins] -- or more particularly, mem- bers of your staff -- will find that we had no approved philosophy of the operation within the Project until well in[to] Sep- tember. The training program which Rocky Farnsworth conducted in Panama was directed solely toward training an instructor cadre in small unit or "guerrilla type" opera- tions. This cadre, when it arrived in Guatemala, in addition to working on build- ing the camp with Carl Jenkins, continued to train the first recruits in the same kind of training they had received. Another example of my positiveness that we were not, at Project level, think- ing of the strike operation is the first conversation that we held in my office in Barton Hall when I referred to the fact that the PM staff had been talking about the development of a strike operation, but that I, myself, was not convinced of it at the time and that I preferred to put small teams into existipg units at the appropri- ate time. As I recall, you [Col. Jack Hawkins] had an open mind at that point; although without positive study of Cuba you leaned to the concept .1 outlined. It was at a somewhat later date, therefore (probably before the first of October), that we talked'again,and you [Col. Jack Hawkins] stated your conviction that Castro could not be overthrown without a major or catalytic effort being made against him. After deliberation, I came to the same conclusion, and we then began to think in terms of expanding the force to the strength of a reinforced battalion, more or less. The foregoing is important only be- cause General Taylor is going into very - 161 - ;;pop SE.:CRE l .... _-._--.-._---~----......--