◆ SpookStack

with the invasion, and we had napalm ear- marked for the 75 tanks that were lined up on the soccer field, and we had .50 cali- bers -- the 8 gun nose B~26's, which was a helluva lot of fire power -- to hit the parked aircraft •.• There was just no doubt in anyone's mind that, with the element of surprise, at the crack of dawn that first day, that there wouldn't have been anything left on those ... on any of those fields. 8/* With the decision made that there would be a pre- invasion strike on D-2, it is easier to understand the reason for the intensification of the training activity as the air operation was moved from JMADD to JMTIDE. That the Cuban crews were ready to undertake tactical air operations, had been attested to by both George Gaines and Gar Thorsrud. Gaines made quite a point of the increased_capability of the B-26 contingent, noting: The B-26 capability -- combat capa- bility -- was exceptional. They had come \ * It was not until he was reviewing this volume that Thorsrud learned of the origin of the D-2 effort. He was highly incensed to learn that such a strike was being considered even as he was being appointed air commander for TIDE and MADD on 24 March 1961. Thorsrud claimed that the first he heard of the plan was when notification of its approval was cabled to him as a fait accompli. As the only Agency staffer who had ~---, first hand experience in a similar air effort e was el er 19nored orgotten y the Headquarters planners. To say he was unhappy to learn how the decision was made is an understatement! - 186 -