◆ SpookStack

SE ~ 4g. The President may never have been clearly advised of the need for command of the air in an amphibious operation like this one. The DD/P was aware that at least two of the President's military advisors, both members of the Joint Chiefs, did not understand this principle. This might well have served to warn the DD/P that the President needed to be impressed most strongly with this principle, by means of a formal written commmication, and also have alerted him to the advisability of accepting the Secretary's invitation to call the President directly. 50. If the project's paramilitary chief, as leader of the overt military effort, had accompanied the DDCI and the DD/P to the meeting with the Secretary he might have brought strong persuasion to bear on the decision. 51. This fateful incident, in our opinion, resulted in part from failure to circulate formal planning papers together with requests for specific confirmation. Shifts in Scope 52. The general vagueness of policy and direction permitted a@ continual shifting of the scope and scale of the project, that is, the type of operational planning commonly referred to as “playing it by ear," and this in turn led to various kinds of difficulties about people, money, supplies and bases. 53. A staffing guide prepared in May 1960 listed a total of 235 personnel required for the foreseeable future (107 being