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Ce cee noo a F. EVALUATION OF PLANNING 1. Before proceeding to an evaluation of the Agency's planning, the over-all policy decisions of the United States Government with reference to the Cuban operation will first be stated in summary form. These decisions not only consti- tuted the background against which Agency planning was conducted but also presented numerous important factors that limited or otherwise determined its scope. 2. We will next endeavor to point out the various _ occasions on which we believe that the Agency officials responsible for the project made serious planning errors, both of commission and of omission » Which affected the project in vital respects. 3. Between the plan approved by President Eifenhower on 17 March 1960 (Annex A) and the invasion plan actually carried out on 17 April 1961 (Annex E) there was a radical change in concept. Originally the heart of the plan was a long, slow, clandestine build-up of guerrilla forces » to be trained and developed in Cuba by a cadre of Cubans whom the Agency would recruit, train and infiltrate into Cube. 4. But thirteen months later the Agency sponsored an overt assault-type amphibious landing of 1,500 combat-trained and heavily armed soldiers. Most of them were unversed in guerrilla warfare. They were expected to maintain themselves