◆ SpookStack

4. (Continued) HOP SECRET our policy az reported in the preas might be ; extremely difficult and involve unacceptable dangers, I would like to talk with you on! from Norstad's headquarters to the White House or Pentagon situation room tonight (13 Sept.) between 1700 and 1800 your time. Unless I bear to the contrary from you by twelve noon today your time I will proceed Paris this evening and make arrangements for this call," 10. On September léth McCone cabled Carter as follows: "Alao believe we must carefully study the prospect i of secret importation and placement of several : Soviet MRBMs which could not be detected by us if Cuban defenses deny overflight. In reflecting H on my observations of Thor installation in Britain and Jupiters in Italy I can envisage a Soviet plan to package missile, control and operating equipment in such 2 way that a unit could be made operational a few hours after a site cleared and a modest concrete pad poured, Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe CIA and community mauat keep government informed of danger of « surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps possibly beyond our capbbility once Cuban defense system operative. Thrust of press reports reaching me is that there exists a clear demarcation between defensive and offensive preparations and I question if we can be sure of this, I recognise Cuban policy decisions most delicate and beyond Agency or my competence, However believe we must give those making decision our best estimate of poasible developments and alternative situations which might evolve and unexpectedly confront us. LL. On 19 September Carter communicated the summary of the conclusions of Cuban SNIE of that date, paragraph D stating that in the opinion of the BNE, establishment of MRBMs in Cuba would be 15