◆ SpookStack

111. (Continued) if fectT y in targeting the October 1: led to the discovery of offensive missil icance of important indicators involved ated to the Presi Despite the intelli, iL. iZ even before the U-2 a: yy on October 14, the intel-. ligence community did not produce for the benefit of policy-level consumers a revision of its erreneous National Intelligence Estimate of September 19, —— We believe a further and exhaustive examination, not. limited to Cuba, should be made by the intelligence community of the complex analytic process employed throughout 7%! community in the assessment of intelligence Indicators 4 e this belief on the nature of the indicetor-type data ich our re- view disclos was availsble during the period fro! to October 1962. — Thirty five examples of such available indicators are set forth in Annex A to this report, In cataloging such examples we appreciate fully that we have the benefit of ea perspective which was not then possessed by the intelligence community. We are also avare that the illustretions listed are bus a small number t from 2 great volume of veports which were received and eh included some demonstrably erronesus information. lie urge _ that the ennexed illustrations be re: not only for their indi- vidual content but also for the purpose of noting the cumulative significance of the information being received, These indicators . beast ty of intelligence sources, such as refugees, clandestine agents, and r naly foreign pLom: .« They deait wi arious aspects of the Soviet militery build-up in Cuba, including the introduction of high-ranking Soviet military per 2 mo i ists in the fields of tronics, jet pilot training, surface-to-air missile defenses, and Soviet long-range air and strategic strilcing forces; the assign- ment to Cuba of Soviet specialists in rocxetry and ato y placed in the Castro reg: concerning expectations that 2 nuclear delivery 79; be established in Cuba; the sightings by ground observers of 2 missiles being deplo; under strict Soviet control