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60. McCone, Memorandum for File, 19 October 1962 TER orears (Sy acs Te B 19 Octaber 1962 a xi 28h) ~10 18-62 wf The Preardral spa MEMORANDUM FOR FILE Early in the morning of October 18th, Secretary McNamara called Mr. McCone at his residence expressing great concern over the reports from NBIC as a result of their examination of the two flights run on i 7 October’5th, Lundahl was at the house with the enlargements which - indicated that, in addition to the three mobile MRBM sites detected on Hight October léth, there appeared to be now two IRBM sites with fixed launchers zeroed on the Eastern United States. McNamara felt that this development demanded more Promp and decisive action. tera ato llink e* TE; The group which had been meeting on / Tuesday met in the Cabinet Room at 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday with the President, State tabled revisions in their papers on covering a limited one-time strike and blockade, most of which are dated 10/18 - 11:00 a.m. At the opening of the meeting, McCone gave a brief resume of current intelligence and Lundahl presented the most recent photography. President questioned Lundahl further if the uninitiated could be persuaded that the photographs presented offensive MRBM missiles, “Lundahl stated probably not and that we must have low-level photography for public consumption, Secretary Rusk then stated that developments in the la & 24 houra had substantially changed his thinking. He first questioned whether, if it is necessary to move against Cuba, and then concluded that it was because Cuba can become ‘a férmidable military threat. He also referred to the President's recent public statements and indicated a feeling that if no action was taken, we would free the Soviets to act any place they wished and at their own will. Also, Rusk stated the failure on our part to act would make our situation unmanageable elsewhere in the world. He furthermore indicated that this would be an indication of weakness which would have serious effect on our Allies. Secretary pointed out to the President that action would involve risks, We could expect counter action and the cost may be heavy. The President must expect action in Berlin, Korea and possibly againat the United States itself. Rusk felt a quick strixe would minimize the risk of counter action. He raised the question of solidarity of the Alliance and seemed to dismiss this question, feeling that the Alliance would hold together. Rus< stated that if we enter upon positive action, we can not say for what the final Soviet response will be and therefore what the final outcome will be. It that the American people will accept danger and sufi they are convinced doing so is necessary and that they have a clear conscience. The Secretary reviewed the circumstances outbreak of World War I, World War Il, and the Korean g with Khrushchev sur surrounding war. These factors militated in favor of consul