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87. (Continued) Senet; The Attorney General raised the question of the attitude of Turkey, Italy, Western European countries , all of which have been “ander the gun" for years, and would take the position that now that the U.S, has a few missiles in their backyard, they become hysterical. This point was discussed back and forth by various people throughout both days of discussion. Secretary McNamara made the point that missiles in Cuba had no great military consequence because of the stalemate mentioned in my October 18th memorandum. General Taylor supported this view in the early parts of the discussion, but in the later meetings expressed increasing concern over the importance of the missile threat from Cuba. Gilpatric supported McNamars's position. McCone doubted it, stating that McNamara's facts were not new as they had appeared in estimates months ago (which McNamara questioned). Nevertheless, he and McCone felt that a complex of MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba would have very jmportant military significance. McNamara took issue claining that the military equation would not be changed by the appearance of these missiles. Bohlen and Thompson questioned the real purpose of the Soviet's actions in Cuba and seemed to feel that their acts may be in preparation for a confrontation with President Kennedy at which time they would seek to settle the entire subject of overseas bases as well as the Berlin question. McCone indicated this might be one of several objectives and undoubtedly would be the subject of discussion at the time of confrontation ; however, McCone doubted that this was the prime purpose of such an elaborate and expensive installation as the Soviets were going forward with in Cuba. Bohlen seemed to favor precipitating talks, and was supported by Thompson, SecDef and Taylor both objected to political talks because it would give time for threatening missiles to become operational and also give the Soviets an opportunity to camouflage the missiles. McCone presented most recent photographs and indicated CIA opinion that the first missiles will be operational wifltin one or two weeks. Bohlen again raised the question of opening up discussions, McNamara agreed that wxxxkoukkbs this would be desirable but emphasized the importance of developing sequence of events which would lead to military action. a2-