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33. (Continued) SECRET it will be emboldened to become more aggressive in fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin America. (Paras. 18-21) C. As the buildup continues, the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defen- sive in purpose, but of a more “offensive” character: e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of short- Tange surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). A decision to provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced without provoking a US military reaction. (Paras. 22-28) D. The USSR could derive considerable military advan- |. tage from the establishment of Soviet medium and inter- | | mediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the estab- } | lishment of a Soviet submarine base there. As between these two, the establishment of a submarine base would be the : | more likely. Either development, however, would be in- + | compatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy H as we we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater_ crease the level of risk in US-Soviet relations ions an the U than the USSR bas displayed thu thi ar,_and. sGonseauently ’ eae ae have important policy i other _areas_ahd ofber problems in East-West relation este ehtone \ Caras. 29-33) E. The Latin American reaction will be to the evidence of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba, rather then to the technical implications of the military buildup. Many Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet military intru- sion into the Hemisphere, but will regard the problem as one to be met by the US and not their responsibility. We esti- mate the chances are better now than they were at Punta del Este to obtain the necessary two-thirds OAS majority for sanctions and other steps short of direct military action aimed at Cuba. If it became clear that the USSR was establishing an “offensive” base in Cuba, most Latin Ameri- can governments would expect the US to eliminate it, by whatever means were necessary, but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involvement. (Paras, 34-37) Reverse Blank 93