◆ SpookStack

Application of the test in Katz and its sequellae to the facts of this case can lead to only one conclusion: Society recognizes Jones's expectation of privacy in his movements over the course of a month as reasonable, and the use of the GPS device to monitor those movements.defeated that reasonable expectation. As we have discussed, prolonged GPS monitoring reveals an intimate picture of the subject's life thiat he expects no one to nave. short perhaps of his spouse. The intrusion such monitoring makes into the subject's private affairs stands in stark contrast to the relatively brief intrusion at issue in Knotts, indeed it exceeds the intrusions occasioned by every police practice the Supreme Court has deemed a search under Katz, such as a urine test, see Skinner y. Ry. Labor Executives. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (urine test could "reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic'); use of an electronic listening device to tap a payphone, Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (user of telephone booth "entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world"); inspection of a traveler's luggage, Bond, 529 U.S. at 338 (travelers are particularly concerned about their carry-on luggage'); or use of a thermal imaging device to discover the temperature inside a home, Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 ("In the home, all details are intimate details"). *15 We note without surprise, therefore, that the Legislature of California, in making it unlawful for anyone but a law enforcement agency to "use an electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a person," specifically declared "electronic tracking of a person's location without that person's knowledge violates that person's reasonable expectation of privacy," and implicitly but necessarily thereby required a warrant for police use of a GPS, California Penal Code section 637.7, Stats.1998 c. 449 (S.B.1667) s 2. Several other states have enacted legislation imposing civil and criminal penalties for the use of electronic tracking devices and expressly requiring exclusion of evidence produced by such a device unless obtained by the police acting pursuant to a warrant. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. $$ 77-23a-4, 77-23a-7, 77-23a-15.5; Minn Stat $S 626A.37, 626A.35; Fla Stat $$ 934.06, 934.42; S.C.Code Ann 17-30-140; Okla. Stat, tit 13, $$ 176.6, 177.6; Haw. Rev. Stat $$ 803-42, 803-44.7; 18 Pa. Cons.Stat $ 5761 Although perhaps not conclusive evidence of nationwide "societal understandings,' Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 n.22, these state laws are indicative that prolonged GPS monitoring defeats an expectation of privacy that our society recognizes as reasonable. So, too, are the considered judgments of every court to which the issue has been squarely presented. See Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d at 447 ("the installation and use of a GPS device to monitor an individual's whereabouts requires a warrant supported by probable cause'); Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223-24 (under art. I. $ 7 of Washington State Constitution, which "focuses on those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass," "use of a GPS device on a private vehicle involves a search and seizure'); cf. Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356. 369-70 (Ma.2009) (installation held a seizure). The federal circuits that have held use of a GPS device is not a search were not alert to the distinction drawn in Knotts between short-term and prolonged surveillance,N* but we have already explained our disagreement on that collateral point. 19 TTU/OTD 007100