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, oT iy NOTICE ; This opioion is subject to formal reyiston before publication CY: the p reliminery print of the United States Reports, Readers are re- quenced, to notify the Reporter of Decisluns, Supreme Court of the Cnited Stites, W ashiugton, DC, 20543, of any typographite al or other formal errors. in order that corrections gity be mude before the pre- Jimioary print gues tu press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 606.—Ocroser TERM, 1969 On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the en. } Seventh Circuit. State of Illinois, Petitioner, = [March 31, 1970} Mr. Justice Buack delivered the opinion of the Court. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Coustitution provides that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the . right ae tc be confronted Ww ath the witnesses against him... .” We have held that the Fourteenth Amend- ment makes the guarantees of this clause obhgatory upon the States. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). One of the most basie of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’ s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his: trial. Lewis v. United Status, 146 U. S. 370 (1892). The question pre- sented in this case is whether an accused can claim the benefit of this constitutional right to remain in the court- -room while at the same time he engages in speech and conduct which is so noisy, disorderly, and disruptive that it is exceedingly difficult or wholly impossible to carry on the trial. The issue arose in the following way. The respondent, Allen, was convicted by an Illinois jury of armed robbery and was sentenced to serve 10 to 30 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary, The evidence against him showed that on August 12, 1956, he entered a tavern in Illinois and, after ordering a drink, took $200 from the bartender