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Pendergast vs. United States. qT makes punishable as a contempt, unless that fraud is ‘‘misbehavior’’ in the ‘‘presence’’ of the court or ‘‘so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice’. And, if the latter requirements are not met, the fact that the fraud may be ‘‘misbehavior’’ is not sufficient. The mere continuance of a fraudulent intent after an act of ‘‘misbehavior’’ in the ‘‘presence’’ of the court does not make that ‘‘mishehavior’’ a continuing offense under § 268. The misrepresentations to the court made possible, of course, the con- summation of this nefarious scheme. But each subsequent step in that scheme did not constitute a contempt unless, like the mis- representation itself, it was ‘‘misbehavior’’ in the ‘‘presence’’ of the court or ‘‘so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice’, No such showing has been made here and none has been attempted. The fact that the scheme was fraudulent and corruptly obstructed the administration of justice does not enlarge the lim- ited power to punish for contempt. It merely means that if peti- tioners can be punished, it must be through the ordinary channels of criminal prosecutions under the Criminal Code. We are forced to conclude that any contempt committed occurred not later than February 1, 1936, when the court ordered the distribution of the impounded funds. Jt was therefore barred by the statute of Hmitations, Reversed. Mr. Justice MurpHy took no part in the consideration or dis- position of this case. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting. I do not agree that we should leave undecided the question whether conduct of this sort constitutes punishable contempt. To use bribery and fraud on the Court to obtain its order for dis- bursement of nearly $10,000,000 in trust in its custody is not only contempt but contempt of a kind far more damaging to the Court's good name and more subtly cbstructive of justice than throwing an inkwell at a Judge or disturbing the peace of a courtroom. {I would hold the conduct of these petitioners to be ‘‘misbehavior” and within the ‘‘presenee’’ of the Court and hence a contempt within the meaning of the statute. I should not deflect what