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a 9) 2 Pendergast vs. United States, 8 in cash from Street. That left $310,000 of the $750,000 ‘‘fee’’ unpaid. And so far as appears it was never paid due to the un- raveling of facts which led te an exposure of the entire corrupt scheme. For about that time an internal revenue investigation of Street’s income tax return disclosed that over $400,000 of the funds for which Street was to account as trustee had been paid to unknown persons, This was reported to the Court in February 1939. A grand jury investigation followed in which the rest of the sordid story was unfolded. See United States v. Pendergast, 28 F. Supp. 601. The Department of Justice caused Pendergast and O’Malley to be indicted for evasion of income taxes on the amounts of money so received. They pleaded guilty and were fined and imprisoned late in May, 1939. Id. On May 29, 1939, O’Malley’s successor filed a motion praying that the decrees of February 1, 1936, be set aside on the basis of those disclosures and that the insurance companies be ordered to restore the funds distributed to them. The court ordered the insurance companies to make restitution; and they did. At the same time the court asked the district attorney whether contempt proceedings should be filed. About a year passed when the court on May 20, 1940, requested the district attorney to institute contempt proceedings against petitioners. An information was filed July 13, 1940. Mo- tions to abate and quash were overruled, 35 F. Supp. 593. There- after answers’ were filed and a hearing had. Petitioners were adjudged guilty of contempt—Pendergast and O'Malley being sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and MeCormack being sen- tenced to probation for two years. 39 F. Supp. 189. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 128 F. 2d 676. We granted the peti- tion for certiorari because of the importance in the administration of justice of the problems raised. Petitioners press several objections to the judgment below. The chief of these are that the offense was not a contempt under § 268 of the Judicial Code (28 U. 8. ©. 385) as construed by Nye v. United States, 318 U. 8. 33, and that even though it was, the prosecution of it was barred by the three year statute of limita- tions contained in § 1044 of the Revised Statutes, 18 U.S. C. § 582, We do not reach the first of these questions and need not express an opinion on it, For although we assume arguendo that the Cir- cuit Court of Appeals was correct in holding (128 F, 2d p. 683) that the conduct of petitioners was ‘‘misbehavior’’ in the ‘‘pres- ence’’ of the court within the meaning of §268 of the Judicial