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No. 391.—Ocrosrr Tram, 1943. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. Petitioners, State of Tennessee. E. E. Ashcraft and John a [May 1, 1944.] Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting. A sovereign state is now before us, summoned on the charge that is has obtained convictions by methods so unfair that a federal court must set aside what the state courts have done. Heretofore the state has had the benefit of a presumption of regularity and legality. A confession made by one in custody heretofore has been admissible in evidence unless it was proved and found that it was obtained by pressures so strong that it was in fact involuntarily meda that tha individual will of the nartionlar eonfacens had hacen overcome by torture, mob violence, fraud, trickery, threats, or promises. Even where there was excess and abuse of power on the part of officers, the State still wag entitled to use the confession if upon examination of the whole evidence it was found to nega- tive the view that the accused had ‘‘so lost his freedom of action that the statements made were not his but were the result of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.’’ Lasenba v. California, 314 U.S, 219, 241. In determining these issues of fact, respect for the sovereign character of the several states always has constrained this Court to give great weight to findings of fact of state courts. While we have sometimes gone back of state court determinations to make sure whether the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment have or have not been violated, in close cases the decisions of state courts have often been sufficient to tip the scales in favor of affirmance. Lisenba v. California, supra, 238, 239; Buchalier v. New York, 319 U. 8. 427, 431; ef. Aftk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadow- moor Dairies, 312 U. 8, 287; 294.