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24 Hagne vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, Tights, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, are of such a nature as not {0 be susceptible of vaination in money. The ques- tion is the same whether the right or privilege asserted is secured by the privileges and immunities clause or any other. When the Civil Rights Aet of 1871 direeted that suits for violation of §1 of that Act should be prosecuted in the district and cirenit courts, the only requirement of a jurisdictional amount in suits brought in the federal courts was that imposed by § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred jurisdiction on the cireuit courts of suits where ‘‘the matter in dispute’? exceeded $500 and the United States was a plaintiff, or an alien was a party, or the anit was between citizens of different states; and it was then plain that the requirement of & jurisdictional amount did not extend to the causes of action authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1871. By the Act of March 3, 1875, ¢. 137, 18 Stat. 470, the jurisdiction of the cireuit courts was extended to suits at common law or in equity ‘‘arising under the Constitution or Jaws of the United States’ in which the matter in dispute exceeded $500. By the Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, the circuit courts were abolished and their jurisdiction was tranaferred to the district courts, and by successive enactments the jurisdictional amount applicabie to certain classes of suits wag raised to $3,000, The provisions applicable to auch suits, thus modified, appear as §24(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C, § 441). Meanwhile, the provisions conferring jurisdiction on district and circuit courts over suits brought under 41 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 were continued as R. 8. §§ 563 and 629, and now appear as § 24(14) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. 8. C. §41(14). The Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091, amended § 24(1) of the Judicial Code so as to direct that ‘‘The foregoing provision as to the sum or value of the matter in controversy shal! not be construed to apply to any of the cnses mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs of this section’’? Thus, since 1875, the jurisdictional acts have contained two parallel provisions, one conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts, district or cirenit, to entertain suits ‘‘arising under the Con- stitution or lawe of the United States’’ in which the amount in 2 This provision made no change in exiating law but wag inserted for the of removing all doubt upon the point. See H. R. Rep. Ne. 783, Part purpose 1, Gist Cong., 2d Sesa, p. 15; Sen, Rep. No. 388, Part 1, 6lat Cong., 24 Geaa., PoE, Ck Miller-Mages On 9, Carpenter, 24 Ped. 433; Amen v, Hager, 26 Fed, 129. ain —, Haque vs, Commitice for Industrial Organization. 25 controversy exceeds a specified valuc; the other, now § 24(14) of the Judicial Code, conferring jurisdiction on those courts of suits authorized by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, regardless of the amount in controversy. Since all of the suits thus authorized are suits arising under a statute of the United States to redress deprivation of righta, privi- leges and immunities secured by the Constitution, all are literally suits ‘arising under the Constitution or lawa of the United States’'. Bat it does not follow that in every such suit the plain- tiff is required by § 24(1) of the Judicial Code to allege and prove thar the constitutional immunity which he seeks to vindicate hag a value in excess of $3,000. There are many rights and immunities secured by the Constitution, of which freedom of speecn and as- sembly are conspicuous examples, which are not capable of money valuation, and in many instances, like the present, no suit in equity could be maintained for their protection if proot of the jurisdic- tional amount were prerequisite. We can hardly suppose that Con- gress, having in the broad terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 verted in all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States a right of action in equity for the deprivation of constitutional im- munities, cognizable only in the federal courts, intended by the Act of 1875 to destroy those rights of action by withholding from the courts of the United States jurisdiction to entertain them. That such was not the purpose of the Act of 1875 in extending the jurisdiction of federal courts to causes of action arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States involving a specified jurisdictional amount, is evident from the continuance upon the statute books of §24(14) side by side with §24(1) of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of 1875. Since the two provisions stand and must be read together, it is obvious that neither is to be interpreted as abolishing the other, especially when it ia remem- bered that the 1911 amendment of 6 24(1) provided that the re- quirement of 8 jurisdictional amount should not be construed to apply to cases mentioned in §24(14). This must be taken ag legislative recognition that there are suits authorized by §1 of the Act of 1871 which could be brought ander § 24(14) after, as well as before, the amendment of 1875 without compliance with any requirement of jurisdictional amount, and that these at lenat must be deemed to include suits in which the subject matter is one incapable of valuation. Otherwise we should be foreed to reach