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2 Fairport, Painesville & Eastern R. R. Co. vs. Meredith. thereunder; but the air was disconnected between the ears and the engine, leaving the brakes of the engine and tender as the only manne af ctanring tha team ar shaolin ite eneadd thns eonsti- AMTaAUS UL SLU but Lin Uh cnecsing di GpuLsay thus tuting a clear violation of the act, since the requirement that a train shall be equipped with power brakes necessarily contemplates that they shall be maintained for use. See United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 229 Fed. 927, 930. The complaint alleges, as one ground of negligence, failure on the part of petitioner to make an air connection between the engine and ears, and to maintain and use the power brakes, In respect _ of that ground of negligence the trial court instructed the jury, ‘n effect, that if the violation of the federal act resulted proxi- mately or immediately in the injury complained of, the railroad company was liable. But the jury was also told that if respondent was guilty of contributory negligence slte could not recover not- withstanding the negligence of petitioner. The trial court also in- structed the jury in respect of the doctrine of the last clear chance —its view apparently being that, notwithstanding the eontribu- tory negligence of respondent, petitioner would be Jiable if, after the danger to respondent became apparent, it could have avoided the injury but for its antecedent failure to maintain and use an equipment of air brakes such as required by the federal act. - The appellate court, in sustaining the judgment of the trial court, held: (1) that the federal law violated by petitioner was en- acted not only for the protection of railroad employes and passen- gers on railroad trains, but the publie generally—that is to say, as applied to the present case, that the requirement of the federal Safety Appliance Act as to power controlled brakes and their use imposed a duty upon the railroad company in respect of travelers at railroad-highway erossinys; and (2) that the instructions of the trial court in respect of the doctrine of the Jast clear chance correctly siated the law. ~- Ohio App. —. are associated together with said 50 per centum shall have their brakes ao used and operated; und, to more fully carry into effect the objects of snid chapter, the Interstate Commerce Cotimission may, from the to time, after full hearing, increase the minimum pereentige of ears in any train required to be operated with power or train brakes whieh must lave their brakes used and operated as aforestid; and a failure to comply with any such require- ment of the said Interstate Commeree Commission shall be subject to the like penalty as failure to comply with any requircment of this section. Fairport, Painesville & Eastern R. R. Co. vs. Meredith. 3 These two rulings present the questions which the writ brings here for consideration. First, The contention of petitioner is that the federal Safety Appliance Act was intended only for the protection of employes and travelers upon the railroads, and has no relation to the safety of travelers upon hiclways or of the public generally. Very likely, the primary purpose in the mind of Congress was to protect em- ployes and passeneers, So much is mdicated by the tith—CAn act to promote the safety of emploves and travelers upon rail- roads”? ete. And this is borne out by the history of the legista- tron. President ILarrisou in fis first ann.al message to Convress called attention te the need of levislation for the better protection of the lives and timls of those engaged in operating the interstate freight lines of the country, and especially the yard men and brakemen, and expressed the view that Congress had power to re- quire uniformity fn flie construction of ears used in interstate eonimerce Gnd the usc of approved sal ety appliances upon them. duit we are asked to hold that the tithe expresses the sole intent of the act, and this involves a question of statutory construetion. The tithe of an act. and the history Ieading up to its adoption, as aids to statutory construction, are to be resorted to only for the purpose of resolviny doubts as to the meaning of the words used in the act in ease of ambivuity, Patterson v. Bark Enudera, 190 U.S. 169, 172; Cornell vo Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 480; Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. 8:78, 92. Compare Russell Co. v. United States, 261 UL 8. 514, 5195522, But here the words of §§ 1 and 9 of the act speak plainly and nothing in the nature or operation of the legislation requires, or suggests the necessity of, an appeal to extrinsic aids to determine their meaning. It may be that the pro- teetive operation of §2 of the act requiring aytomatic couplers? Was not meant to extend to persons other than employes. Com- pare 8t. £. d' San Fran. BLE. v. Conary. 238 U. 8. 243; Louisville d Nashville RR. Ca. v. auton 243 U7, S. 617, 620; Lang v. New York Cent. A. R. Co,, 255 U, 8. 455; Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U. 8. 239, 243; Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Eisenhart, 280 Fed. 271. But 2Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any common carrier engaged in inter- state commerce by railroad to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate traffie not equipped with couplers coupling automatieally by imipact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the ears,