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& 7" # al wo ML u a td, Ve. a led to the enactment ef Transportation Act, 1920, (Title IV, 41 Stat. 474, et seq.). We found that Transportation Act, 1920, in- troduced into the federal legislation a new railroad policy, seeking to insure an adequate transportation service. To attain that end, new rights, new obligations, new machinery, were created. Rail- road Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy BR. R. Co, 257 U. 8. 563, 585; New England Divisions case, 261 U. S. 164, 189, 190; Dayton-Goose Creek Railway Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456, 478. It is a primary aim of that pelicy to ‘eeure the avoidance of waste. That avoidance, as well as the maintenance of service, is viewed as a direct concern of the public. Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U. 8. 312, 317; Pezas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Gulf, Colorada & Santa Fe Railway Co., 270 U. 8. 266, 277. The authority given to the Commission to authorize consolidations, purchases, leases, operating contracts, and acquisition of control, was given in aid of that policy. New York Centrat Securities Corporation v. United States, 287 U. 8. 12, 24, 25. The criterion to be applied by the Commission in the exercise of its authority to approve such transactions—a criterion reaffirmed by the amendments of Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, 1933—is that of the controlling public interest. And that term aa. a cate is not s earrier to acquire control of two or more carriers through ownership of their stock; or for a corporation which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more carriers to acquire contro! of another earrier through ownersiip of its stock. ‘*(b), Whenever a consolidation, merger, purehage, lease, operating eon- tract, or acquisition of control is proposed under enhdivision (a), the carrier or carriers or corporation seeking authority therefor shall present an applica- tion to the Commission, and thereupon the Commission shall notify the Governor of each State in which any part of the properties of the catriers involved in the proposed transaction is situated, and also such carriers and the applicant or applicants, of the time and place for a public hearing. If after such hearing the Commiasicu finds that, subject to such terma and con- ditions and such modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable, the Droposed consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating eontract, or ac- quisition of control will be in harmony with and in furtherance of the plan for the consolidation of railway properties established pursuant to paragraph (3}, and will promote the public interest, it may enter an order approving and authorizing such consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating con- tract, or acquisition of control, upon the terms and conditions and with the modificationg so found to be just and reasonable’’. Teras et al. vs. The United States e¢ al. 7 as used in the statute is not a mere general reference to public welfare, but, as shown by the context and purpose of the Act, ‘‘has direct relation to adequacy of transportation service, to its essen- tial conditions of economy and efticiency, and to appropriate pro- vision and best use of transportation facilities’. New Fork Cen- tral Securities Corporation v. United States, supra. It is in the light of this eriterion that we must consider the scope of the Commission’s authority in relation to provisions which are intended to relieve interstate carriers from burdensome outlays. The fact that burdensome expenditures may be required by state regulations is not a barrier to their removal by dominant federal authority in the protection of interstate commerce. As we said in Cotorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 163: ‘‘ Prejudice to inter- state commerce may be effected in many ways. One way is by excessive expenditures from the common fund in the local interest, thereby lessening the ability of the carrier properly to serve inter- state commerce’’, Even explicit charter provisions must yield to the paramount regulatory power of the Congress. New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591, 601. Obligations assumed by the cor- poration under its charter of providing intrastate service are snb- ordinate to the performance by it of its federal duty, also assumed, ‘efficiently to render transportation services in interstate com- merce’’, Colorado v. United States, supra, p. 165. See Transit Com- mission v. United States, 284 U. S. 360, 367, 368; Transtt Commas- sion Vv. United States, 289 U. 8.121, 127; Florida v. Unifed States, decided April 2, 1934. In the present case, the findings of the Commission, setting forth undisputed facts, leave no doubt that the provision of the lease permitting the abandonment, or removal from the State, of general offices and shops of the lessor has direct relation to economy and efficiency in interstate operations and to the achievement of the purpose which the Congress had in view in its grant of authority. Counsel for the United States and for the Interstate Commerce Commission eraphasize the limitations of the challenged provision. They point out that, in addition to the customary ‘‘general offices’’ of railroads, Section 3, of Article X, of the Constitution of Texas provides that railroad corporations must ‘‘maintain a public office or place in this State for the transaction of its business, where transfers of stock shall be made, and where shall be kept for in-