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6 Lynch ws, United States. with all the wrong and reproach that term implies, as it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a municipality or a citizen.’’ The Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719. Third. Contracts between individuals or corporations are im- paired within the meaning of the Constitution whenever the right to enforce them by legal process is taken away or materially lessened.* A different rule prevails in respect to contracts of sovereigns. Compare Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, decided May 21, 1934, ‘‘The contracts between a Nation and an individual are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign and have no pre- usions to compulsive force. They confer no right of action dependent of the sovereign will.’’"* The rule that the United States may not be sued without its consent is all embracing. In establishing the system of War Risk Insurance, Congress vested in its administrative agency broad power in making de- terminations of essential facts-—power similar to that exercised in respect to pensions, compensation, allowances and other gratui- tous privileges provided for veterans and their dependents. But while the statutes granting gratuities contain no specific provision for suits against the United States,’° Congress, as if to emphasize the contractual obligation assumed by the United States when issuing War Risk policies, conferred upon beneficiaries substan- tially the same legal remedy which beneficiaries enjoy under policies issued by private corporations, The original Act provided in § 405: **That in the event of disagreement as to a claim under the con- ict of insurance between the bureau and any beneficiary or bene- ‘aries thereunder, an action on the claim may be brought against we United States in the district eourt of the United States in and for the district in which such beneficiaries or any one of them resides, ’7!+ Although consent to sue was thus given when the policy issued, Congress retained power to withdraw the consent at any 8See Worthen Co, v. Thomas, No. 856, decided May 28, 1934: and cases cited by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. 8, 398, —. *Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 81. 10See Sixth, infra, p. 11. The provision for suit was later modified, See World War Veterans’ Act 1924, $19, a8 amended by Act of July 3, 1930, c. 849, 46 Stat. 991, 992, under which these suits were brought. Lynch vs. United States. 7 time. For consent to sue the United States is a privilege accorded ; not the grant of a property right protected by the Fifth Amend- ment. The consent may be withdrawn, although given after much deliberation and for a pecuniary consideration. DeGroot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 482. Compare Darrington v. State Bank, 18 How. 12, 17; Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527-529; Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. 188, 195; Ratiroad Company v. Tennessee, 101 U. 8. 337; Railroad Commission v. Alabama, 101 U. 8. 832; In re Ayers, 123 U7. 8. 448, 505; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17; Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U. 8. 240; Baltzer & Taaks v. North Caro- lina, 161 U. 8, 246.1? The sovereign’s immunity from suit exists whatever the character of the proceeding or the source of the right sought to be enforced. It applies alike to causes of action arising under acts of Congress, DeGroot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 431; United States v. Babcock, 250 U. 8. 328, 331; and to those arising from some viclation of rights conferred upon the citizen by the Constitution, Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166, 168. The character of the cause of action—the fact that it is in contract as distinguished from tort—may be important in determining (as under the Tucker Act) whether consent to sue was given. Otherwise, it is of no significance. For immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty which may not. be bartered away. Mere withdrawal of consent to sue on policies for yearly renewable term insurance would not imply repudiation. When the United States creates rights in individuals against itself, it is under no obligation to provide a remedy through the courts. United Siates v. Babcock, 250 U. 8. 328, 331. It may limit the individual to ad- ministrative remedies. T'utun v. United States, 270 U. 8. 568, 576. And withdrawal of all remedy, administrative as well as legal, would not necessarily imply repudiation. So long as the contract- ual obligation is recognized, Congress may direct its fulfilment without the interposition of either a court or an administrative tribunal. Fourth, The question requiring decision is, therefore, whether in repealing ‘‘ali laws granting or pertaining to yearly renewable term insuranece’’ Congress aimed at the risht or merely at the remedy, It seems clear that it intended to take away the right; 1zCompare also Imhoff-Berg Silk Dyeing Co. v. United States, 43 F. (2d) 836, 841; Synthetics Patent Co. v. Sutherland, 22 PF. (2d) 491, 494; Kogler tv. Miller, 288 Ped. 806.