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nN OD OW - 9 10 11 12 13 14 15. 16 17 18 19 20 21 2 nN 23 24 25 26 27 ‘ manager here and that ‘of the chief’ of * [4,5] The application of these princi- ples to the city manager and chief of police seems clear, The Oakland charter pro- vides: “The City Manager * * -* sub. ject to the civil service provisions of this : Charter * * * shall have the power ' to appoint, discipline and remove * * * all subordinate officers and employees of the’ -City responsible to him.” Article VI, section 27, subdivision 2, Stats.1931, p. : 2653, “The City Manager, among other - limitations, shall have no power under this’: Charter * * * f. To dismiss, suspend ° or discharge any officer or employce in the * classified civil service, except in accord- ance with the civil service provisions of this Charter.” Article VII, section 27,° subdivision 5, -Stats.1931, p.° 2655. - The . chief of police does not possess the same. authority. He is-appointed by the manager; subject to the civil service provisions of the., Charter but like all other “chief officials,” . “has the power to suspend any subordinate.» temporarily for incompetency or derelic-... tion of duty. Section 8! of the charter . (Stats.1931, p. 2665) provides for the sus- . pension, fine, s44 removal of all persons}; in the classified civil service on order of: the city manager, or-on his approval of the,,, Suspension made by a “chief official,” but... in all such cases the person affected may .. :appeal to the civil service board. which .. “shall fully hear and determine the mat-: -ter.” The finding and decision of the civil ° service board shall “forthwith bc enforced: and followed” by the board or official frbm.,, .Which the proceedings were initiated,,. Sees; tion 82, Stats.1932, p. 2665..° + [6:7] We can find no essential -differ-"" ‘ence between these provisions of the-Oak-"- ‘land charter, and those of the Los Angeles charter which were before the court ia’ ‘Michel v. Smith, supra, And there -is:no%* “essential difference in the status of the-city™ police involved in that case. For -these “ reasons we are satisSed that the questions * here involved are. determined by the cone - PRIS 40-97 " FALL et al, v. STATE ex rel. FREENAN.: i No. 17098, . . Appellate Court of Indiana . Jan. 11, 1944. {, OMeccrs C>107 o FERNELIUS V, FE RCE tal U2, SINR P The grant ‘of power to a public officer carries with it a mandate that such power shall be exercised {or the public good and in the manner preseribed by law. : OINTS AND AVTHORITIES UNL ETAL, STATE Ex heb FReEm NE 5a 2370 2. Municipal corporations C=183(5) A tawn marshal, within prescribed ter- ritorial, Jimitation, has the powers of a con- stable, and the duties and obligations of . that office are imposed upon him. Burns’ Ann.St. §§ 48-201, 48-206, 49-3403, 49-3410. . 3. False Imprisonment C=20(!) Complaint, alleging’ that town mar- shal forced plaintiff into automobdile and forced her to go to county seat and there wrongfully gave her inzo custody of sher- iff of county and caused her wrongful im- prisonment in county jail for period of 30 minutes without probable cause and on false charges, as_a result of which plain- tiff became ill and disabled and was in- iured in her_pame and reputation, stated , a good cause of action for talse imprison- OO Ne ment, — +, Where person arrested 1§ actainca or hel4-by officer for a-longer. period, of time than is required under the circumstances, without warrant or authority, he: will have a cause of action for’ false imprisonment against the officer and all‘others by whom he-has been unlawfully detained. 52 44° 8, False Imprisonment C=, i370 . Where town marshal, making arrest in Odon where there was duly qualified and “Atting justicecat peace, tfansported person arrested a distance of 25 miles_and incar- “Cérated her in jail, all without warrant or judicial order, act of marshal could not ‘be “justified on ground of ‘necessity and fact that person arrested was_subsequently re- “leased did not relieve marshal from liability Yeel or false imprisonment. j reputation, or publish the natural or alleged defects . of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. $ $4 3 ORC (Enacted 1872, Amended by Code Am.1873~74, ¢. 614, § 23) L{ BELCH, le Validity. This section was held unconstitutional in Eberle v. Municipal Court, Los Angeles Judicial Dist. (1976) 127 Cai Rptr 204, 55 C.Add 423, aie Ad 423, § 250. Malice: presumption Malice presumed. An injurious publicat‘on is presumed to have been malicious if no justifiable motive, for making it is shown. Definition; punishment; privilege ridicule. Every person who willfully, and with a malicious intent to injure another, utters_any- slan- der, is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten “Hhousand dollars (310,000), or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such et, fine and imprisonment. ~ RO\GINAL Bxyfc! ~ 4 e- aader is a malicious defamation, orally uttered, ter or not it be-communicated through ur by