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was attora to de meticulous {9 its vork ta elev pf the demands by other Siow ade? 'T: y eenl e Tutore Inortanci of Btantarde of Proof. ne was Andleated that ‘continued atteapts t ‘to ‘penetrate the Departnen . would be made by persong who did not betong to *front® organizations and whose ae records as far as routine checks were clear. The standards of proof fa | “ special investigations must be different, The security officers of the Department must bear in mind the distinction betveen foreign agents and nere “joiners” and formolate a planned program of investigation to deal ~~ with this probles. The current standards of investigation are calculated 6 0 deal oy with routine requirenents and the Laventigative service of the : not edequate. = fee eo Bp ether, fe elations to ¥BI and Other concen . . ae ne The investlgsting unit of the Department was not able to dope wien’ , atteapts to penetrate the Department by planting agents of forelga intelligence” organizations in the Departzent. The CSA investigetion cannot discover such © azents of foreign intelligence organizations and the investigation was limited | to information from other agcneles that did not have the Department's wecurity.”’ tu db anata aana etth thia nvahias the Departzen : Ri i oa ce & a ae a needs as their purpose. It is indicated to cope with this probiem the Yeparte wust utilize other agencies or expand their own facilities. The problem vas to know the intelligences organizations and personnel of other governmente operating in this country, #0 that the caployees who vould be used a mach WU governnente could ve recognized. oo . z's wet ke A oan pi commen ” meh renner detec alte Age Le The situation at that ‘tine, according: ‘to ‘the report, 1 vas ledterona’ "and the Department organised precautionary security meacures without knovledge : ef the matters, which could only be partially effective. The linited inveatigatt ° ae eden bed Be een 2 aenendAnatiwea inv tmant af -saresnnel ag . "facilities must be CGRCGRETAVEG be B¥Oa RAPT ORES Say | $n SSyRens os and | Une, ang conserve the appropriations. ” oe It was “concluded that the intelligence ‘Syetea of forelen. powers and” me their agents must be exposed by sound eviderce. The investigative facilities | uaed by the Departrent, primarily the FSI, has not produced such evidences +: 25,3 Moreover, each employee dientased as an agent or probable agent must becong _ the audject of an intensive security investigation to seatity $ she dient ssal Hature of FBI's Gommeration , * “fhe FRI acts ‘for the Departnent Wy ‘way of acconcdation and rm ‘Gennot? > @tee Farthernere, t the FBI eatedliched its ewn pricrity on Investigations. and ' tranenitted only such information as ia the opinion of the F5I officiale, ‘would de properly known te the Departuent.