◆ SpookStack

1631 -HQ-1462938 Stated that those who would not be deterred by words would be deterred by weapons. Therefore, the Iraqi leadership ordered the army to assemble as many forces as possible to confront "treachery" and the disturbances. HUSSEIN acknowledged that incidents of looting by certain individuals "got mixed in" with the actions of those participating in the uprisings. Regarding the decisions regarding whom to place in charge of areas in Southern Iraq during that time and what authority and powers to delegate, HUSSFIN replied, "I said our decision was to confront and defeat the enemy." The participants in the Uprisings were to be "put in their place," if not by word, then by weapon. HUSSEIN stated that a lengthy discussion of this matter was not required. The individuals who had crossed the border from Iran were members of the Dawa Party who were assisted by additional Iranian forces. Together, these individuals killed, burned, looted, and committed other crimes. According to HUSSEIN, when faced with this situation, one does not need to ask one's self what action to take. Procedure, however, dictated that the Iraqi leadership meet to discuss the matter. All members agreed regarding the necessary Iraq Government response to the situation. HUSSEIN stated the threat to the Iraq Government in 1991 existed in both Northern and Southern Iraq. An uprising was even attempted in Baghdad. HUSSEIN stated that those "sitting on the fence" joined the uprisings after witnessing police stations or government offices attacked and seeing no response by the authorities. As the Iraq Government reasserted control, the "enemy" went to a new area or reinforced in an old one. According to HUSSEIN, the Iraqi military strength grew over time and "the circle started tightening around the enemy." [HUSSEIN interview, March 16, 2004]. Regarding the senior Iraqi leaders assigned in 1991 to Southern Iraq to deal with the Shia uprising, HUSSEIN stated, "We assigned responsibility to whoever was going to handle the situation." AL-ZUBAIDI and KAMAL MUSTAPHA ABDALLAH were sent to Nasiriyah, KAMIL was sent to Karbala, AL-MAJID was sent to Basrah, and AL-DURI was sent to Al-Hillah to confront the Shia uprisings in those areas. During this interview, HUSSEIN denied that he had previously stated that in 1991, he was only interested in results and did not want to know the details of how his commanders would stop the Uprising. HUSSEIN asked, "Who says I did not want to know how?" When informed by the interviewer that HUSSEIN himself had previously made this statement, he stated that any person's main goal would have been to stop the 80