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1631-HQ-1462938 There were no targets for the support weapons, rather, the regiment used light and medium machine guns and RPGs. All of the attacks were visual. The advancing forces came under fire and returned fire, although it did not last long as there was no resistance. The enemy had apparently thrown down their weapons and retreated. AL-ZUBAYDI and the Governor of Kut put the city in order. This happened while KAMAL MUSTAFA and the regiment were still there. Some party members, police and some of the Governor's men were still fighting. Some people were captured, but the SRG did not debrief or transport them. [KAMAL MUSTAFA interview, April 29, 2004]. AL-MAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution, including executions and imprisonment, of Shia Muslims living in southern Iraq in 1991, and denied personal knowledge of the destruction of Shia villages during this or any other time. [February 4, 2004 interview]. However, on January 2, 2004, AL- MAJID stated that he and other military commanders had received orders from HUSSEIN to execute any Iraqi civilians who were uprising against the Iraqi regime. On March 2, 1991, AL-MAJID arrived in Basra where approximately 200 Iragi civilians were being detained by the 5lst Division under the command of SAIF ALDIN AL-RAWI. Of the 200 civilians detained, 36 were being held at Saad Circle, in Basra, for committing crimes against the Iraqi Government. Of the 36, all but two had admitted to the crimes. However, the two were implicated by the other 34. AL-MAJID executed the two by shooting them with a rifle to make an example out of them. AL-MAJID claimed he released the other 34. [Attached as Enclosure #] Regarding the 1991 Uprising, HUSSEIN stated that within a day of the cease fire of 1991, "some elements" had initiated sabotage operations in the southern Iraq cities of Basrah, Nasiriyah, and Amarah. Later, this activity spread to the northern cities of Suleimaniyyah, Erbil, and Kirkuk. HUSSEIN stated the groups conducting these operations were "pushed by Iran," and Iraq captured 68 Iranian intelligence officers who were later exchanged for Iraqi prisoners. At the time of the uprisings, most bridges in Iraq had already been destroyed, electricity was unavailable, water service was sporadic, and food supplies were minimal. In the aftermath of the war, these factors contributed to general unrest in the country. HUSSEIN stated that "elements" participating in the uprisings were a mixture of thieves, rebels and "those from Iran," whom HUSSEIN described as individuals from Iranian government services, Iraqis of Iranian origin, and Iraqis who had 77