◆ SpookStack

EN A EAC EE Me f-Yr Ppcn e-em See = Yemen lar yer nas aaa () ( , More importantly, a 1974 District Attorney's Office memorandun analysis of the testimony elicited by Ward at the hearing suggested that the testimony was designed to project the following conclusions: - 1. That a significant conflict had always existed between eyewitness accounts and irrefutable physical evidence regarding muzzle distance, which in itself, suggested the possibility of a second gun. 2. Prior investigation by law enforcement had failed to fully utilize the physical evidence in determing the number of guns involved because exclusive reliance was placed upon the method of microscopic bullet comparisons even though other methods were known to be available, such as neutron activation analysis, a process where the most subtle differences in the chemistry makeup of material could be found under examination. Dr. Vincent Guinn testified at the Baxter Ward hearings that he had offered his services to Dr. Noguchi for neutron activation immediately following the assassination of Senator Kennedy, and Dr. Noguchi replied at the Ward hearings that DeWayne Wolfer had told Noguchi in 1968 it was not necessary to pursue such an examination. 3. Although the method of microscopic comparison of bullets was valid in the abstract, the expert used in the investigation (Wolfer) may have erred because other experts (Harper, Bradford, and MacDonell) did not confirm his conclusion. 4, The physical evidence could presently be utilized for various investigative procedures, including refiring ef Sirhan's gun and/or neutron activation analysis, with the same degree of reliability in assessing the number of guns involved if such proce- dures had been employed during the investigation subsequent to Kennedy's assassination. The District Attorney's Office memorandum cautioned that the predetermined conclusion of Ward's hearing was that the District Attorney and/or the Los Angeles Police Department failed to fully investigate obvious discrepancies in the theory of the lone assassin, as manifested by the prosecution's failure to initially subject the firearms evidence to extensive scrutiny. Furthermore, the impact of the Ward hearings was that any resistance by autho-~ rities against reexamination of the ballistics evidence would also be suspicious, even though there would be no guarantee of obtaining a reliable conclusion in a new examination. Additionally, the Ward hearings reviewed three previously sug- gested two-gun theories (subject of the 1971 investigations) and focused on a new two-gun theory. Three so-called two-gun theories had been developed prior to the Ward hearing. 1. An alleged conflict between eyewitnesses and the physical evidence as to whether Sirhan was facing Kennedy or off to his side at the time of the shooting. ae wees we aww Ve 2. The allegation that Wolfer had actually excluded Sirhan's gun as being the only gun at the crime scene by using ancther gun rather than Sirhants gun for firing test bullets, and then coneluding that the bullet taken from Kennedy's neck had been fired from the same gun which yielded the test bullets. - 15 -