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JN 44-1 citizen but was adputy or assistant on duty in all that was done in violation of $242, The motion to dismiss thus admits all things well pled in the indictment and results ir, the inescapable conclusion that the county and city cfficials who are defendants are legally charged with a viclation of $242 in this indictment. In Brown v. United States, (6CA) 204 F.2d 247, Brown was cenvicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 8371. The aprellant was charged with violation of $242 but such charges agairsct him were dismissed by the Court because he was a private individual and not an officer acting urder cclo: cf law as in Commonwealth of Virginta v. Rives, 100 US 313; United States v. Cruikshanks, 92 VS 542; Screws v. United States, 325 I'S 110, 65 S.Ct. 1039, The Ccurt said: ‘The district court dismissed the substantive counts which charged appellant with violating $242 but submitted the conspiracy count to the jury. This actien was clearly correct. ****The fact that appellant was a private citizen and legally incap- able zf violating $242 does not render him immune from a charge of violating 18 U.S.C, $371 by engag- ing in an agreement with a law enforcement officer acting under color of state law to violate 18 U.S.C. $242. United States v. Holte, 236 US 140; 35 S.Ct. 271, 59 L.Ed. 504. As declared in Chadwick v. United States, 6 Cir., 141 F. 225, at page 237, opinion by Judge Lurton: "It is sufficient if any one of the parties to a conspiracy is legally cap- able of conmitting the offense, although the other parties may not have been." As was stated in United States v. Trierweiler, D.C., 52 F.Supp. 4, at page 7: "Te is immaterial that they themselves may not have had the capacity to violate the sta- tute for they became liable criminally if they conspired to violate that statute and if one or more cf their fellow conspirators had the BQ -29 SO | Ab [9