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A, The Security Service is, however, not a department of the Home It operates independently under its own pienge ng: san but he can and does seek direction and guidance from the & Secretary, subject always to the proviso that its activitics mam be absolutely free from any political bias or influence. ~*~ a (3) The function of the Security Service is to defend the Realm as a whole from dangers which threaten it as a whole, such as espionage on behalf of a foreign Power, or internal organisations subversive of the State. For this purpose it must collect information about individuats, and give it to those concerned. But it must not, even at the behest of a Minister or a Government Department, take part in investigating the private lives of individuals except in a matter bearing on the Defence of the Realm as a whole. : oo . (4) The Head of the Security Service may approach the Prime Minister himself on matters of supreme importance and delicacy, but this is not to say that the Prime Minister has any direct responsibility for _ the Security Service. He has certainly none in day-to-day matters. It would be a mistake for the Prime Minister to take such responsibility because he cannot in ptactice exercise adequate supervision, and he has not the secretariat for the purpose. a j “s (v} Application of Principles - 240, The result of these principles is that, if the Director-General of the Security Service is in doubt as to any aspect of his duties—as, for instance, when he gets information about a Minister or senior public servant indicating that he may be a security risk—he should consult the Home ‘Secretary. The Home Secretary then will have to take the responsibility for further action, that is to say, whether to take steps to eliminate the security risk cr to put up with it. If a mistake is made, it is the Home Secretary who will be responsible to Parliament. 241. It was suggested to me that, when the conduct of a Minister was in question, it would be preferable for the Director-General to approach oorcach the Home Secretary because leatetee Aleen the Prime Minister ditect rather than apprceaci ine sOgte | orca the Hoine Secretary might find it embarrassing to have to investigate the conduct of another Minister. The majority view was, however, that in all cases there should be a clear and unambiguous channel to the Home Secretary. (vi) Ministry of National Security 242. Most witnesses thought it was not desirable to set up a Ministry of National Security, and for these reasons: It is important that each Government:Department (¢.g., the Service Departments) should be regarded as responsible for its own internal security. It would lead to slackness if each Department could feet it could leave its security to others. The Security Service performs a very useful function in advising Government Depastiments on their security problems but should not take them over. If it be right that each Government Department is responsible for its own internal eggs then the Security Service itself deals with national security as a . great body of opinion before me was that this should be dealt with as_ the responsibility of the Home Secretary and not as the responsibility of a separate Minister. ' , . a, Coe . ~ ‘a? =~ os a !