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fN Memorandum t. Mr. E. S&S. Miller i . . Re: Electronic Surveillance for Intelligence Purposes, etc. is correct, then what. Keith does is prohibit the Government from utilizing domestic intelligence electronic surveillances without a judicial warrant, but recognizes that there is no procedure for obtaining a warrant and suggests that Congress — consider providing for one, ey ee eee Keith, (407 U.S. 297) at page 303, quotes Section 2511 (3),: Fe eee tan meet = me aa Mote "Nothing contained in this chapter... shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect... nan tS emia and observes: At most this is an implicit recognition that the President does have certain powers in the specified areas...But so far as the use of the President's electronic surveillance power is concerned the language is essentiaily neutral... : Se rr el ee re Ne ge em ’ what Section 2511(3) certainly confers no powers...It merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted to limit or disturb such powers as the President may have under the Constitution. In short, Congress simply left presidential powers where it found them," sembn sake may me ; After examining the language and legislative history of Section 2511(3) Keith, at page 308, states: "One could hardly expect a clearer SO ; expression of Congressional neutrality. ; The debate above explicitly indicates that re nothing in Section 2511(3) was intended to expand or to contract or to define (Court's emphasis) whatever presidential surveillance povers existed in matters +ffecting the national ' ‘security. If we could accept the Government's characterization of Section 2511(3) as a corgressionally prescribed exception (my emphasis} -2- a CONTINUED - OVER