◆ SpookStack

66 Nos. 77-1698, 77-1210 & 77-1370 whether it was disclosed that he was “the source” for the information leading to the raid. And both Piper and Mitchell sent memoranda to the FBI in Washington which said that O’Neal was the only source for the preraid information about the weapons and the apart- ment.72 A determination that Groth’s informant did not exist would have significant ramifications for plaintiffs’ case. The warrant used to gain entry to the apartment would be supported only by the misrepresented, triple hearsay Groth received from Jalovec, and Groth’s own perjured statement. Perhaps more importantly, such a conclusion would bolster plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims. It would be powerful evidence of Groth’s bad faith vis-a-vis plain- tiffs. And it would highlight the importance of the federal defendants in the alleged conspiracy. If O’Neal was the only eyewitness informant able to provide the crucial pre-raid information about the apartment, there could be no question that he and his conduit to the state defendants, Mitchell, were indispensable to the entire operation. Even if Groth did have an informant, disclosure of his identity would be important to a resolution of the case since that informant might be a critical figure in the conspiracy alleged by plaintiffs. If O’Neal, who was being paid for his work by the federal defendants, was also the informant Groth relied on in his affidavit, plaintiffs would have additional evidence of the federal involvement in the raid itself. Further, the person described by Groth as his informant—according to Groth a member of the BPP—could be a coconspirator. Groth said that his informant asked when he was going to “move on the crib,” and provided information about the weapons when told that the presence of weapons in the # The danger that law enforcement officials, ‘protected a4 the informer’s privilege, may, and have misrepresente themselves on affidavits for warrants, saying that informers have provided information which they have not provided, has been recognized by the courts. See, ¢.g., MeCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 816 n. 2 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting), United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1960).