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Fred Hampton — Part 3
Page 44
44 / 251
40 Nos. 77-1698, 77-1210 & 77-1870
of a sole instigator who personally communicated with
all the participants in the conspiracy and orchestrated
each of their actions does not preclude a jury from con-
cluding that a conspiracy existed. Plaintiffs presented
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable person
could find that all the defendants named in the initial
conspiracy performed discreet functions in concert to
further a common plan—the raid.
Liability for civil conspiracy requires proof of more
than an agreement among conspirators; a plaintiff must
show that an actual deprivation of his rights resulted
from the conspiracy. See supra, p. 36. The raid and the
injuries suffered by plaintiffs as a result of the raid
reasonably could be found to constitute this actuai
deprivation of rights. Thus, plaintiffs have established a
prima facie case under sections 1983 and 1985(3) for
civil liability: a conspiracy:to violate their civil rights
and actual deprivation of those rights arising from the
implementation of the conspiratorial plan.
IV. CLAIMS OF INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR
ACTS BEFORE AND DURING THE RAID
As an alternative to the conspiracy allegations, plain-
tiffs assert that these defendants are subject to in-
dividual liability under section 1988 or directly under
the Constitution. The gist of their claims is that these
defendants are liable for the intentional and negligent
deprivation of rights which occurred during the raid.25
*° Defendants urge that plaintiffs be denied relief on the
ground that negligent conduct is not cognizable under sec-
tion 1988. We are not persuaded by this argument. Defen-
dants are correct that “mere negligence” is not actionable un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 567
ue! Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 932 (1978). In Jamison v.
eCurrie, 565 F.2d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 1977), Chief Judge
Fairchild articulated the standard for a constitutional cause
of action: “The plaintiff must show that [the police officers’]
misbehavior was either intentional or in reckless disregard of
his constitutional rights,” citing Bonner v. Coughlin, supra. The
evidence offered by plaintiffs, however, viewed in the light
most favorable to them, satisfies this test. Plaintiffs’ case rests
on evidence of excessive force, assault, battery, and wrongful
(Footnote continued on following page)
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